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PLANTIFFS' "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" CONTAINS SEVERAL INACCURACIES 
1. That "plaintiffs signed the closing documents on November 30,2006" (Respondents' 
Brief, p. 1): It is undisputed that plaintiffs never signed Addendum No. 3, moving the closing date 
from November 30' to December 8th. The district court did note on two separate decisions as 
follows: "A time is of the essence" clause was also contained within the Contract. It is undisputed 
that neither party performed before November 30,2006, and therefore, the contract expired by its 
own terms" (R. pp. 55, 81). 
2. That "based upon conduct of defendants. plaintiffs took steps to secure financin~ 
through Bank of America Corporation" (Respondents' Brief, p. 2): Plaintiffs cite the affidavit of 
Daniel Godoy, (Aug. R. Exhibit 1) in support of this asserted fact. However, the Godoy affidavit 
does not so state. Nor does the record contain any support for the assertion that plaintiffs' efforts 
to get funding were based upon defendants executing Addendum No. 3. To the contrary, plaintiffs' 
failure to execute the addendum is evidence they placed no reliance on it. 
3. That "the district court found as a matter of law that the conduct of defendants 
constituted waiver": (Respondents' Brief, p. 16). Defendant sellers do concede that the actual 
language of the district court was "waiver has been established by the act of signing" (R. p. 82). 
However, the district court ultimately concluded that "there is substantial, but conflicting, evidence 
in the record to support the claim of duress" (R. p. 83). Plaintiffs concede that waiver is the 
"intentional relinquishment of a right" and waiver is "a voluntary act". (Respondents' Brief, p. 15). 
Duress, on the other hand, is "that condition of mind produced by the wrongful conduct of another, 
rendering a person incompetent to contract with the exercise of his free will power". Gordon v. 
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Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622,627,15 1 P.3d 818 (2007). Thus, in fact, the district court found that factual 
issues surrounding the claim of duress precluded summary judgment based upon waiver. That is, 
given the factual issue of duress, an essential component of waiver remains unresolved, i.e., the 
voluntariness of the consent to waive. 
REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUE OF FRAUDS, 
PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS ARE CONCLUSORY AND INCONSISTENT 
Plaintiffs fail to address that uortion of the settlement agreement which reauired the 
defendants to convey to ulaintiffs a security interest (deed of trust) in the real urooerty: Plaintiffs 
argue that, because the agreement was merely to settle a lawsuit, the strictures of the Statute of 
Frauds are suspended. There is no authority cited for this position. Plaintiffs fail to address, either 
by citation or argument, why the deed of trust provision in the oral settlement agreement does not 
implicate the Statute of Frauds. Idaho law is clear that settlement agreements are treated like any 
other agreement as respects the Statute of Frauds. Olsen v. Dept. of Water Resources, 105 Idaho 98, 
101,666 P.2d 188 (1983). 
The deed of trust which plaintiffs contemplated would be executed by defendants recites that 
defendants are conveying an interest in real property. "Grantor [defendants] does hereby irrevocably 
grant, bargain, sell and convey to Trustee in trust with the power of sale, that property in the County 
of Owyhee, State of Idaho, described as follows, and not containing more than forty (40) acres: . 
. ." (R. p. 98). 
Plaintiffs misconstrue the Statute of Frauds in arguing that no "title to the property was to 
exchange (sic) hands" (Respondents' Brief, p. 7). The statute (Idaho Code section 9-503) recites in 
pertinent part: "No . . . interest in real property . . . can be . . . granted . . . otherwise 
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than by operation of law or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party . 
. . granting . . . the same . . ." Clearly, the proposed deed of trust in this matter 
contemplates granting to the trustee the deed oftrust which, at the very least, constitutes an "interest" 
in real property and within the Statute of Frauds. 
Plaintiffs' argument concerning Dart performance belies the inconsistency of their position: 
First, plaintiffs concede that the "settlement agreement undeniably contemplated only money 
damages" (Respondents' Brief, p. 7). Thereafter, plaintiffs observe: "that plaintiffs did not seek 
monetary damages for breaching the settlement agreement. Instead, plaintiffs sought specific 
performance of the settlement agreement" (Respondents' Brief, p. 8). 
The judgment in this case is a money judgment with directions to "execute a promissory note 
and deed of trust to secure payment" (R. p. 142), both judgment and security based upon an oral 
agreement. Plaintiffs' insistence on invoking the doctrine of part performance is an admission that 
the transaction implicates the Statute of Frauds. As noted in Appellants' Brief (pp. 17, 18), the so- 
called part performance undertaken (vacating the trial date) was neither reasonable nor related in any 
way to the deed of trust which was the raison d'etre for the applicability of the Statute of Frauds. 
ALL ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
WERE RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
That an agreement not complete in its material terms cannot be specific all^ enforced: In 
Appellants' Brief (p. 19), defendants argued that the doctrine of part performance was not applicable 
because the oral agreement was not complete in all its material terms. Contrary to plaintiffs 
assertion, this issue was addressed in the trial court. Plaintiff argued: "Likewise here: the deed of 
trust provision is essential. Absent a writing respecting this provision, an essential term is missing 
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and settlement agreement is unenforceable". See Exhibit 1 referenced in Order Granting Motion to 
Augment the Record dated July 1,2009. 
When the parties contemplate all or aportion of an agreement be reduced to writing. there is 
no enforceable contract absent that writing: In Exhibit 1 to the Order Granting Motion to Augment 
Record (p. 6), defendants cited Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 (App. 1993): 
Although a real estate contract need not contain a security provision 
if none is contemplated, once parties attempt to provide for security it 
becomes an essential term of the contract. 
Id. 124 Idaho at 75 1. 
Defendants argued: "In Lawrence the Court held that a failed attempt to include a security 
provision renders the security provision an "essential" term of the agreement" (Exhibit 1, p. 6) 
The district court found that the parties contemplated that adeed oftrust be executed: "Exhibit 
13 states that defendants Griffith and Porter agreed to pay $40,000 within six months of the 
agreement at an interest rate of six percent, the payment to be secured by a deed of trust" (R. p. 136). 
BECAUSE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS WITHIN THE PURVIEW 
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE AUTHORITY OF DEFENDANTS' 
ATTORNEY. LIKEWISE. HAD TO BE IN WRITING 
Other than the argument that the settlement agreement was not within the Statute of Frauds, 
plaintiffs offer no authority to support the contention that the authorization of defendants' attorney 
to settle the case need not be in writing. Again, plaintiffs fall back on the argument that settlement 
agreements are, sui generis, not required to be in writing. However, Olsen v Department of Water 
Resources, 105 Idaho 98,666 P.2d 188 (1983), makes it very clear that settlement agreements as a 
class are not immune from the Statute of Frauds: 
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Thus, if the oral stipulation entered into in this case was an executory 
contract establishing and declaring water rights, it is a contract falling 
within the statue of frauds and is unenforceable in the absence of a 
writing. See Sirns v. Purcell, 74 Idaho 109,257 P.2d 242 (1953) (oral 
compromise agreements within the statute of frauds unless taken out 
by part performance); Francis v. Green, 7 Idaho 668,65 P. 362 (1 901) 
(oral settlement contract to convey water rights within statute of frauds 
unless taken out by part performance). 
Id 105 Idaho at 101 
Even as to oral agreements outside the Statute of Frauds by part performance, there is no 
authority that such circumstance relieves the attorney/client from the requirement of Section 9-503 
that there must be written authority to execute a conveyance of real property. 
BY HOLDING THAT THE FACTUAL ISSUE OF DURESS 
PRECLUDED ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE DISTRICT 
COURT, EFFECT. HELD THAT A COMPONENT OF WAIVER 
HAD NOT BEEN SHOWN, i.e., VOLUNTARINESS OF THE WAIVER 
The district court ruled that a waiver had occurred, but then, paradoxically, ruled that the 
factual issue of duress precluded entry of summary judgment (R. pp. 82,83). 
Incomvleteness of the waiver ruling: The district court did not conclude there was waiver as 
a matter of law. Rather, he concluded that there was waiver only in the event duress did not exist. 
The defendants argue that plaintiffs' claim of waiver fails because the 
signatures were obtained under duress. . . . If McArthur 
threatened to sue Griffith and Porter if they did not sign the time 
extension in Addendum #3, he would not have had a good faith basis 
to make that threat. . . . This Court finds that there is substantial, 
but conflicting, evidence in the record to support the claim of duress 
and that it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence 
establishes that the signatures on Addendum #3 were made under 
duress. 
R. pp. 82,83. 
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Waiver and duress compared: "Waiver" is the voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. Medical Serv. Group v. Boise Lodge No. 310, 126 Idaho 90,94,878 P.2d 789 (1994). 
"Duress" includes that condition of the mind produced by wrongful conduct which deprives aperson 
of the exercise of his free will. Gordon v. Lofhrop, 143 Idaho 622, 627, 151 P.3d 818 (2007). 
Therefore, in concluding that there was a question of fact as to the existence of duress, the district 
court concluded that a question of fact existed as to an indispensable component of waiver, i.e., the 
voluntariness of the waiver. 
Relevance of this analvsis: In companion litigation, Wixom, et a1 v. GrifJith, Canyon County 
Case No. CV07-092M, plaintiffs there are seeking a real estate commission with respect to the 
aborted real estate transaction between plaintiffs here and defendants. In that case, plaintiffs are 
invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel, arguing that the district court's finding of waiver here 
estops defendants in Wixom from denying the existence of waiver. Defendants seek a determination 
from this Court that, because the district court found there was a question of fact as to the existence 
of duress, the district court, in effect, concluded that a question of fact existed as to an indispensable 
component of waiver, i.e., the voluntariness of the waiver. That is, given the incomplete 
determination of the waiver issue, invoking collateral estoppel on this issue is not appropriate. 
PLANTIFFS FAIL TO IDENTIFY THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE 
RELIANCE COMPONENT OF THE ALLEGED WAIVER 
A requisite element of waiver is "reasonable reliance". Fullerfon v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 
824, 136 P.3d 291 (2006). Plaintiffs argue that they relied on the defendants' execution of the 
Addendum No. 3, extending the closing date from November 30 to December 8. Defendant Griffith 
signed the addendum on December 1; defendant Porter signed the addendum on December 4. 
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Plaintiffs never signed Addendum No. 3, extending the closing deadline to December 8. 
Plaintiffs failed to fund the transaction by the closing deadline of November 30. There is no 
evidence, e.g., the testimony of the plaintiffs, that they undertook actions in reliance on defendants' 
execution of the addendum subsequent to the November 30th closing deadline. It is undisputed that 
plaintiffs failed to fund the transaction in a timely fashion. But there is a dearth of evidence of any 
reliance conduct undertaken by plaintiffs after November 30th other than dilatory payment of their 
portion of the purchase price to the closing agent on December 7". See Redovian affidavit (Aug. R., 
Exhibit 2, para. 6). 
Also, as noted previously, plaintiffs' failure to sign Addendum No. 3 is evidence that they 
placed no reliance on defendants' execution of the addendum. 
DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION THAT THE ORAL SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE IS NOT FRIVOLOUS AND 
IS SUPPORTED ON MULTIPLE LEGAL GROUNDS 
Preliminam note: Defendants argue that a party is entitled to attorney fees "when justice so 
requires" (Respondents' Brief, p. 20), citing Idaho Code section 12-121. Actually, the provisions of 
this section are narrowed and made specific by Rule 54(e)(l) I.R.C.P. which allows section 12-121 
fees "only when it [the court] finds from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued 
or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation . . . $3 
As noted below, the defense of this matter was neither unreasonable nor frivolous, etc., under 
sections 12-121 and 12-123 of the Idaho Code. 
1. The oral settlement agreement contemplated the transfer of an interest in real property, i.e., 
a deed of trust, and is unenforceable as within the Statute of Frauds. 
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2. Also, under the same Statute of Frauds, where a client authorizes his attorney to negotiate 
an agreement covered by the Statute, such authorization must be in writing. See Idaho Code section 
9-503. In addressing the requirement for written authorization, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
observed that where the purported agreement is sought in the context of litigation the wisdom of such 
a writing is all the more apparent. 
The policy reasons for the statute of frauds are never more evident than 
when opposing litigants come together to thrash out their differences. 
. . . Unlike the situation at issue in Bock and Halstead, in which the 
attorney and client enjoyed a specials status underscored by a complete 
unity of interest, the current case involves litigants with divergent 
interests and incentives. . . . While it is true that attorneys are 
deemed to be officers of the court . . . their involvement in a 
transaction does not, in and of itself, eclipse the need for certainty in 
land titles to such an extent that the commands of the legislature can be 
overlooked. 
Byblos Corporation v. Salem Farm Realty Trust, 692 A.2d 5 14,5 17 (N. H. 1997) 
3. The doctrine of part performance is not available to remove the transaction from the statute 
of frauds for the following reasons: (a) the primary remedy sought by plaintiff is a money recovery; 
IBM v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 199, 677 P.2d 507 (App. 1984); (b) vacating the trial date prior to 
executioil of the contemplated documents (promissoiy note and deed of trust) does not constitute 
reasonable conduct by the parties (plaintiffs) seeking relief. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology 
Specialists v. Wood, 135 Idaho 485,486,20 P.3d 21 (2001); (c) the alleged part performance (vacating 
the trial date) did not relate to that aspect of the transaction that placed it within the Statute of Frauds, 
i.e., the conveyance of a deed of trust; (d) because the oral agreement is not complete and certain in all 
its materials terms, the doctrine of part performance cannot be applied, i.e., there is no oral agreement 
as to the terms of the deed of trust. Leftunich v. Key Bank, 141 Idaho 362,367, (109 P.3d 1104 (2005); 
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and (e) where the oral agreement contemplates the intent to have a written documentation, the oral 
agreement is not enforceable. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690,696,83 P.2d 293 (1992). 
(4) On the waiver issue: (a) There is no evidence of reliance by the plaintiffs on defendants' 
execution of Addendum No. 3; and (b) in any event, a factual question is presented with respect to the 
voluntariness of the consent to waive, i.e., the district court found that a factual issue existed as to 
whether defendants were the victims of duress. Summary adjudication of the waiver issue is not 
appropriate. 
For each of the above-enumerated reasons, the defense presented by the defendants has not been 
unreasonable or frivolous and is warranted by existing law "or by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law" (Idaho Code section 12-123(b)(ii)). Finally, there 
is no assertion that the defenses presented were intended to "harass or maliciously injure" plaintiffs 
(Idaho Code section 12-1 23(b)(i). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief (summarized in the preceding section) and in Appellants' 
Brief, the summary judgment in this matter should be vacated and the matter remanded to be litigated 
on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 151h day of July, 2009. 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15" day of July, 2009, I caused to be served two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Dinius & Assoicates 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 130 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
X U.S. Mail - - 
- Hand Delivery 
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